When selling information, sometimes the seller can increase the revenue by giving away some partial information to change the buyer's belief about the information product, so the buyer may be more willing to purchase. This work studies the general problem of advertising information products by revealing some partial information. We consider a buyer who needs to make a decision, the outcome of which depends on the state of the world that is unknown to the buyer. There is an information seller who has access to information about the state of the world. The seller can advertise the information by revealing some partial information. We consider a seller who chooses an advertising strategy and then commits to it. The buyer decides whether to purchase the full information product after seeing the partial information. The seller's goal is to maximize the expected revenue. We prove that finding the optimal advertising strategy is hard, even in the simple case that the buyer type is known. Nevertheless, we show that when the buyer type is known, the problem is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a function. Based on this observation, we prove some properties of the optimal mechanism, which allow us to solve the optimal mechanism by a convex program (with exponential size in general, polynomial size for special cases). We also prove some interesting characterizations of the optimal mechanisms based on these properties. For the general problem when the seller only knows the type distribution of the buyer, it is NP-hard to find a constant factor approximation. We thus look at special cases and provide an approximation algorithm that finds an ε-suboptimal mechanism when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyer who will make the purchase.
Introduction
Revealing selected features of products has long been a standard strategy for improving product sales. Creative advertising messages, product demonstration at trade fairs, free beginning chapters of online books, and movie previews all reveal partial information about associated products to potential consumers, with the hope to increase the subsequent likelihood of purchase. Recent years have seen a growing interest in markets for information, in part due to an increasing number of online data sources. When it comes to information, revealing partial information may decrease the amount of information that is finally being sold. Can a seller engage a partial revelation strategy to improve her revenue from selling the information? How should an information seller optimally advertise for her information?
We introduce the problem of optimal advertising for information products. We consider an information buyer who faces a decision problem, the outcome of which depends on the state of the world, which is unknown to the buyer. The buyer is willing to purchase additional information about the state of the world if it could help him make a better decision. There is an information seller who holds private information about the state of the world and wants to sell it to the buyer. For example, the information seller can be an airline who will know the exact delay of a flight 24 hours before its scheduled departure and the buyer is a business traveler who needs to decide whether to take this flight to attend an important, time-sensitive event.
The seller wants to optimize her revenue by advertising the information first, that is, by providing some partial information to the buyer (or more formally revealing a signal to the buyer), and then set a price for her information. We consider a seller who chooses an advertising strategy (e.g., will tell the buyer whether the flight delay is longer than six hours or not) before the realization of her private information, and will then commit to the advertising strategy. The seller can set different prices for her full information when sending different advertising signal. For example, the airline can charge 5 dollars for the exact delay when it advertises that the delay is longer than six hours and 10 dollars otherwise. But for each case, there is one fixed price, so that the price itself won't reveal additional information about the state of the world. The buyer cannot observe the state of the world but has a private prior belief about it. The buyer knows the seller's advertising strategy in full and decides whether to purchase the full information after seeing the realization of the advertising signal, e.g., decides whether to pay 5 dollars for the exact delay after knowing that the delay is longer than six hours.
In this work, we focus on the interaction between the seller and the buyer through the advertising strategy but omit the consideration of advertising cost. We assume that the cost difference between different advertising strategy is relatively small compared to the seller's revenue.
A ubiquitous but controversial assumption in economic theory is the common prior assumption. More specifically, in models of asymmetric information, it assumes that there is an ex ante stage at which the individuals have identical information and subsequently update their beliefs in response to private signals. The plausibility of assuming common priors has been questioned (see [Morris, 1995] ) and become conceptually problematic. In this work, we do not assume common priors always exist, but consider the individuals' beliefs about the external world to be the primitives of the model. Nevertheless, the case when a common prior exist is just a special case of our model.
We start with the simple case when the seller knows the buyer's type (i.e. the buyer's prior belief and utility function). Even in this simple case, computing the optimal advertising strategy is NP-hard. However, we find that the problem is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a function which is the product of two components. This first component captures the misalignment of the seller's and the buyer's priors. The second component represents how much the buyer would gain if he knows the state of the world. Based on the observation, we prove some properties of the optimal mechanisms, from which we further derive some positive results and interesting observations. For example, in this simple case, it is beneficial for the seller to give away partial information only when the buyer has a wrong prior. Another interesting observation is that there exist optimal mechanisms that give away a lot of information when the buyer faces a few options in the decision problem. We also give a convex program (with exponential size in general, polynomial size for special cases) that solves the optimal mechanism. For the general problem when the seller does not know the buyer's type but only knows the type distribution, the problem is not only hard to solve, but also hard to approximate within a constant factor. We give an approximation algorithm that finds an ε-suboptimal mechanism when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of the buyer who will make the purchase.
Our Results
In this work, we propose and formulate the optimal advertising problem for information product. There are infinitely many ways that the seller can advertise the information. Solving the optimal advertising mechanism turns out to be hard even in the simple case when the buyer's type is known to the seller.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). When the buyer's type is known to the seller, solving the optimal advertising mechanism is NP-hard.
Despite the hardness of the problem, we characterize the optimal advertising (when the buyer's type is known) as finding the concave closure of a function and present an exponential-size convex program that solves the optimal mechanism. Furthermore, when the information product has only a few possible realizations (e.g. the weather is going to be sunny/cloudy/rainy...), or the buyer faces a decision problem with only a few options, the convex program will have a small size and thus will be efficiently computable.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). When the buyer's type is known to the seller, solving the optimal advertising mechanism is equivalent to finding the concave closure of a function. The optimal mechanism can be solved by an exponential-size convex program. When the number of possible realization of the information is a constant, or the buyer faces a decision problem with a constant number of options, the convex program will have a polynomial size.
The function, whose concave closure indicates the optimal advertising mechanism, is the product of two components. The first component is what we call the likelihood ratio function, which captures the difference between the seller's belief and the buyer's belief about the likelihood of an event. The second component is the cost of uncertainty function, which represents how much the buyer is willing to pay for the information product based on his belief. We prove some properties of the optimal advertising mechanism by analyzing the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty in the optimal mechanism, which may be of independent interest. These properties allow us to drastically reduce the design space to a finite set, and fortunately we can then formulate a convex program to solve the problem. In addition, we also use these properties to gain insight into the optimal mechanism (Theorem 1.3) and find simple characterization of the optimal mechanism (Theorem 1.4).
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). When the number of actions is small, the seller can reveal a lot of information to optimally advertise the (remaining) information, the fewer actions the buyer has, the more information the seller can reveal freely.
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). When the information has binary realizations, the optimal mechanism has simple characterization and can be found by simple arithmetic computation.
The problem becomes more challenging when the seller does not know the buyer's type but only knows its distribution. Compared to the case when the buyer's type is known, it is more difficult for the seller to choose the best price (after the advertising). Because when the type is known, it is clear how much the buyer is willing to pay and the seller can extract the full surplus, but when the type is unknown, the expected revenue is a function of the price that depends on the type distribution. In consequence, the design of the advertising mechanism becomes extremely complicated. We show that the optimal mechanism is not only hard to solve, but also hard to approximate.
Theorem 1.5 (Informal). When the buyer's type is drawn from a known distribution, it is NP-hard to find a constant-factor approximation algorithm for our optimal information advertising problem.
Nevertheless, we show that in some special cases when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyer who will make the purchase, it is possible to find an ε-suboptimal mechanism by a linear program.
Theorem 1.6 (Informal). When the buyer's type is drawn from a known distribution, and there are only polynomially many possibilities of the set of buyer types that will make the purchase, we can find an εsuboptimal mechanism within running time polynomial in 1/ε and the input size.
The theorem can be used for some important special cases, for example, when the buyer's type space is relatively small, or when the information has binary realizations. This ε-suboptimal mechanism can be solved by a LP.
Related Work
Markets for information and data have attracted an increasing amount of attention recently. We refer the readers to for an overview of the vast literature. In parallel with the analysis of competitive markets of information (see [Sarvary, 2011] for an overview) and the study of data intermediaries , our work falls into the category of a monopoly information holder directly selling information to the buyers. In contrast to some works that focus on specific information product, e.g. selling cookies [Bergemann and Bonatti, 2015] and selling datasets [Mehta et al., 2019] , we consider selling information in a general framework, which makes our work most relevant to [Eső and Szentes, 2007 , Bergemann et al., 2018 , Babaioff et al., 2012 , Chen et al., 2020 . What makes our work different from the previous ones is that we consider a seller who can only use posted price mechanism with a single price. The previous works [Eső and Szentes, 2007 , Bergemann et al., 2018 , Babaioff et al., 2012 , Chen et al., 2020 all consider designing a menu of different information with different prices. The size of the optimal menu is as large as the type space (due to the use of the revelation principle). Babaioff et al. [2012] , Chen et al. [2020] actually consider a seller that can interact with the buyer in multiple rounds. Although larger mechanisms give the seller more power to extract revenue, they are also more difficult to implement and participate in. Therefore in this work, we consider the design of simple mechanisms for selling information, in which the seller just posts a price for the full revelation of information (menu size equal to one), but can partially reveal some relevant information before the sale to promote the information product.
There is also a vast recent literature on information design that studies how different information disclosure rules influence the outcomes of games in different settings (see [Bergemann and Morris, 2019] ). A particularly relevant topic is Bayesian persuasion [Kamenica, 2018 , Dughmi, 2017 , especially the public persuasion problem [Dughmi, 2019 , Xu, 2020 . In Bayesian persuasion, there is a sender and a receiver. The sender wants to persuade the receiver to take some actions by choosing a signal (or in our words, choosing some partial information) to reveal to the receiver. One may think that our problem is just a persuasion problem because our goal is basically to persuade the buyer to buy the information. The key difference between our problem and Bayesian persuasion is that: in Bayesian persuasion, the sender only cares about the receiver's action after seeing the signal; but in our problem, what the seller cares is the revenue, which depends on not only the signal and the buyer's action but also the price chosen in the mechanism. This makes our problem much more challenging than the persuasion problem. We also want to point out a work [Rayo and Segal, 2010] that studies a quite different information disclosure problem but has a very close underlying mathematical model. Actually their problem can be seen as a special case of ours. We discuss this in Appendix C.
It is worth noting that there is a fundamental difference between advertising regular goods (see [Bagwell, 2007] for an overview) and advertising information products. Providing additional information about regular goods will not make any change to the goods themselves. But advertising information product may change the information product itself as revealing relevant information may decrease the amount of information that is finally being sold.
Model
We consider the setting with a monopolist information seller and an information buyer who needs to make a decision. The state of the world ω ∈ Ω = {1, . . . , n} can be observed by the information seller, but cannot be observed by the information buyer.
There is an information buyer who needs to choose an action a ∈ A. His utility u(ω, a) depends on both the action he takes and the state of the world. 1 In this work, we assume that the utility function is normalized so that u(ω, a) ∈ [0, 1]. The buyer cannot observe ω but has a prior belief about the state of the world, denoted by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ ∆Ω. We assume the set of possible priors Θ is a finite set. In the work, we also call θ the type of the buyer.
There is an information seller who has the access to the realized state of the world ω. The seller also knows the utility function u(ω, a) and the joint distribution of the state of the world ω and the buyer's prior θ, denoted by µ(ω, θ).
Our model does not require a common prior between the seller and the buyer. The case when there exists a common prior is a special case of our model: the seller and the buyer shares a common prior distribution µ(ω, θ), where ω is the state of the world and θ represents the buyer's private observation, or the buyer's type. Therefore when the buyer's type is realized to θ, he will believe that ω follows distribution µ(ω|θ). This is a special case of our model, in which θ = µ(ω|θ).
We assume the seller can only sell the information by a posted price mechanism with a single price, that is, set a price for telling the buyer the value of ω. But before selling the information, the seller can advertise the information of ω by sending out some partial information, or more formally, the seller can send a signal that is correlated with the state of the world. The buyer will update his belief about the state of the world ω after seeing the signal. The seller then post a price for the full revelation of ω. The price can be different when the buyer sees different partial information. Formally, the seller can use an advertising rule defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. An advertising rule S, π, {p s : s ∈ S} consists of • a finite set of signals S,
• a signaling scheme π, which is a random mapping from the support of the state of the world Ω to the signals S, i.e., π : Ω → ∆S,
• and a price menu {p s : s ∈ S}.
When using advertising rule S, π, {p s : s ∈ S} , the seller will first send a signal s ∈ S by the signaling scheme π, that is, when the state of the world is ω the seller will send signal s ∈ S with probability π(ω, s).
Then if the signal that has been sent is s, the seller will charge price p s for the full revelation of ω.
Example 2.1. In the example of selling flight delay, the seller sends two possible signals S = {below 6 hours, above 6 hours} with signaling scheme π(ω, below 6 hours) = 1(ω ≤ 6), π(ω, above 6 hours) = 1(ω > 6).
Buyer strategy. Suppose the buyer has prior θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ) before seeing the signal s, then when the signal is realized to s, the posterior belief of the buyer will be η s (θ) = θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s) n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s)
.
(1)
Then the highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the full revelation of ω will be his expected loss of not knowing ω based on his posterior belief η s (θ). We define this expected loss (as a function of η) as the cost of uncertainty function for the buyer. where C a (η) = n ω=1 η ω (max a ′ ∈A u(ω, a ′ ) − u(ω, a)) is a linear function of η. Since C(η) is the minimum of |A| linear functions, C(η) is a concave function.
So when the signal is realized to s, the buyer will purchase the full revelation of ω if and only if his expected gain of knowing ω based on his posterior belief is higher than the price, C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s .
Mechanism design problem. We assume that the seller will choose and commit to an advertising rule before observing the realization of ω. The timing is as follows 1. The seller chooses an advertising rule based on µ(ω, θ), u(ω, a) and then posts the advertising rule.
2. The state of the world ω and the buyer's type θ are realized. Only the seller observes ω and only the buyer knows θ.
3. The seller sends a signal s according to the posted advertising rule and set price p s for the full revelation of ω.
4. The buyer decides to purchase or not.
The seller's expected revenue will then equal θ∈Θ ω∈Ω
where η s (θ) is the type-θ buyer's posterior belief when receiving s, and C(·) is the cost of uncertainty function. The seller's goal is to find an advertising rule that maximizes his expected revenue.
Known Buyer Type
We start with the simple case when the buyer type is known to the seller, i.e., |Θ| = 1. In this case, if the seller and the buyer share the same prior, θ = µ, the seller's optimal selling strategy is to directly charging a fixed price for the full revelation of ω. But if the buyer's prior is not necessarily equal to µ, the seller can possibly get a higher revenue by advertising the information. Finding the optimal advertising rule is NP-hard even for this simple case. However we show that finding the optimal advertising rule can be represented as finding the concave closure of a function (in Section 3.1). Based on the representation, we prove three properties of the optimal mechanism (in Section 3.2). In Section 3.3, we use these properties to formulate an exponential-size convex program that computes the optimal advertising rule. When the size of Ω or the size of A is a constant, the convex program can be reduced to a polynomial size (Section 3.4). We also use these properties to derive some interesting characterization results in Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.
Concave Closure Formulation
We first formulate our optimal advertising problem as an optimization problem. When the buyer's type is known to the seller, the optimal advertising rule can fully extract the expected surplus from the buyer after sending the signal, i.e., an optimal advertising rule S, π, {p s : s ∈ S} must have p s = C(η s (θ)) for the known buyer type θ. To simplify the notation, we denote by S, π an advertising rule, and use η s to represent the posterior η s (θ).
Optimal mechanism formulation. Recall that when the signal is realized to s, the posterior belief of the buyer is η s = θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s) n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s)
(2)
The optimal mechanism charges the buyer his cost of uncertainty p s = C(η s ) when s is realized. Define φ µ (s) = ω µ ω π(ω, s) to be the probability of sending s. Then the seller's expected revenue is equal to s∈S φ µ (s) · C(η s ) and the seller's optimization problem can be formulated as
Observe that the probability of sending a signal φ µ (s) = ω µ ω π(ω, s) depends on the true underlying distribution µ but not θ, while C(η s ) depends on the buyer's belief θ. We show that we can rewrite φ µ (s) as well as the constraints as functions of θ, so that the whole optimization can be viewed as finding the concave closure of a function f (x) at point θ.
Concave closure representation. Let φ θ (s) = ω θ ω π(ω, s) be the probability of receiving s based on the buyer's prior belief. The ratio φ µ (s)/φ θ (s) can be determined as long as we know the posterior η s , i.e., we can define the ratio φ µ (s)/φ θ (s) as a function of η s ,
for Example 3.1 and the function in gray line is its concave closure f .
The last equality is because π(ω, s)/ ( ω θ ω π(ω, s)) = η s ω /θ ω according to (2). We call R(η s ) the likelihood ratio function. Note that R(η s ) is a linear function of η s with coefficients µ ω /θ ω . Then the seller's expected revenue can be represented as the expected product of the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty,
According to (2) and φ θ (s) = ω θ ω π(ω, s), we have φ θ (s)·η s = θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s) . So the constraints s∈S π(ω, s) = 1, π(ω, s) ≥ 0 can be equivalently written as
Therefore the seller's problem (3) can be equivalently represented as
Observe that the optimal objective value of (4) is just the value of the concave closure of the product of the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty f (x) = R(x) · C(x) at position x = θ. Let's look at an example.
Example 3.1. Consider binary state Ω = {0, 1} with µ(0) = µ(1) = 0.5. The decision maker wants to guess the state of the world u(ω, a) = 1(ω = a) with a ∈ {0, 1}. The buyer believes that ω = 0 with probability 0.8, i.e. θ(0) = 0.8, θ(1) = 0.2. So the cost of uncertainty is
and its concave closure f is plotted in Figure 1 as a function of η 0 . So the optimal expected revenue is f (0.8) = 5 16 . Since (0.8, f (0.8)) is a convex combination of (0.5, f (0.5)) and (1, f (1)), the optimal advertising rule sends two possible signals S = {s, t} with η s = (0.5, 0.5) and η t = (1, 0), which leads to π(0, s) = 1 4 , π(0, t) = 3 4 , π(1, s) = 1, π(1, t) = 0.
When the buyer and the seller share a common prior θ = µ, the likelihood ratio is always equal to one. As a result, the optimal objective value is the value of the concave closure of f (x) = C(x), which is a concave function. The concave closure of a concave function is just itself, which means that it is optimal for the seller to not reveal any partial information, but directly set a price for the full revelation.
Proposition 3.1. When θ = µ, one of the optimal advertising rules for the seller is to not reveal any partial information and directly charge a price for the full revelation, i.e. S = {s}, π(ω, s) = 1 ∀ω.
In more general cases when θ is not necessarily equal to µ, the function f (x) = R(x) · C(x) is neither concave or convex, and it turns out that the seller's optimal information advertising problem (4) is NP-hard.
Theorem 3.1. When |Θ| = 1, it is NP-hard to find the optimal advertising rule (4).
The proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix A.1. Despite the hardness result, in the following sections, we give some observations about the optimal advertising rule and formulate an exponential-size convex program that solves this optimization problem.
Properties of the Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we give some observations about the optimization mechanism. Some of the observations are similar to the ones in [Rayo and Segal, 2010] in which they have simpler decision variables and valuation functions. The first observation (Lemma 3.1) is that there exists an optimal mechanism with |S| ≤ n = |Ω|. The second and the third observations (Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3)are the necessary conditions for a mechanism to be optimal, by considering the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty generated by the mechanism.
First, having a larger set of signals S may help the seller extract more revenue, but we show that a set of n signals is sufficient for the seller to maximize the expected revenue.
Lemma 3.1. There exists an optimal advertising rule S, π with |S| ≤ n = |Ω|.
We give the proof of the lemma in Appendix A.2. The idea of the proof is that for any optimal mechanism with |S| > n, we can replace one of the signals with a convex combination of the others, so that |S| can be decreased by one.
Second, an optimal advertising rule S, π should not have an η s that can be decomposed η s = αη (1) + (1 − α)η (2) to strictly increase the expected revenue
is a linear function of η s , and the cost of uncertainty C(η s ) = min a C a (η s ) is a piece-wise linear function of η s . Let P a = {η : C a (η) ≤ C a ′ (η), ∀a ′ } be the region in which C(η) = C a (η) is a linear function. We consider the local convexity/concavity of R(η s )C(η s ) within P a . Notice the following fact. is strictly convex along a direction d = (d x , d y ) with a positive slope d x d y > 0, i.e., for any point (x 0 , y 0 ), function
is strictly convex when d x d y > 0. Because the second directional derivative of g in the direction d at any point (x 0 , y 0 ) is equal to
For the same reason, g(x, y) is strictly concave along a direction d = (d x , d y ) with a negative slope d x d y < 0.
Consider x = R(η s ), y = C(η s ) and g(x, y) = R(η s )C(η s ). Then for two-dimensional points {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ P a }, we should have the following lemma (illustrated in Figure 2 ). Lemma 3.2. Let S, π be an optimal advertising rule. Consider a single s ∈ S with φ θ (s) > 0. Let η s be the buyer's posterior when s is sent. Suppose η s ∈ P a . Define Q a = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ P a } as the region on xy-plane that represents the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of the points in P a . Then the point (R(η s ), C(η s )) cannot be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope within Q a , that is, there cannot exist η (1) , η (2) ∈ P a with η s = αη (1) + (1 − α)η (2) , α ∈ (0, 1)
and
The points on the two black edges cannot be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope. They can possibly be (R(η s ), C(η s )) of an optimal advertising rule.
The points in the gray area can be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope. They cannot be (R(η s ), C(η s )) for any optimal advertising rule. Figure 2 : An illustration of Lemma 3.2. We plot the ratio of uncertainty (x-coordinate) and the cost of uncertainty (y-coordinate) of the points η inside polytope P a . The polygon in the pictures represents the region Q a = {(R(η), C(η)) : η ∈ P a }. The two black edges represent the points that can possibly be (R(η s ), C(η s )) for some s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule. The gray area represents the points that cannot be (R(η s ), C(η s )) for any s ∈ S of an optimal advertising rule.
)) lying on a line with a positive slope. Since function g(x, y) = xy is strictly convex along a direction with positive slope, decomposing η s into αη (1) + (1 − α)η (2) should strictly increase the objective value of (4), which contradicts the optimality of the advertising rule.
Third, an optimal advertising rule S, π should not have two η s , η t with s, t ∈ S that can be merged into one signal
to strictly increase the expected revenue. We prove the follows.
Lemma 3.3. The optimal advertising rule S, π should not send two signals
Proof Sketch. Consider merging s and t into one single r so that
lying on a line with a negative slope. Since g(x, y) = xy is a strictly concave function along a direction with a negative slope, merging s and t should lead to a higher objective value assuming C(·) is linear,
When C(·) is concave but not linear, the gap will only be larger as C(η r ) ≥ αC(η s ) + (1 − α)C(η t ). So merging s and t will still increase the objective value,
which contradicts the optimality of the advertising rule.
with a positive slope. The gray segment is the region Qa.
The gray polygon is Qa. 
In both of the cases, (R(η s ), C(η s )) can be decomposed along a direction with a positive slope.
The omitted full proof can be found in Appendix A.3.
Optimal Mechanism by Convex Program
With the observations, we compute the optimal advertising rule by an exponential-size convex program. The key idea is to reduce the design space to a finite set by showing that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each η s lying on the segments between the vertices of P a . Then, fortunately, by defining variables associated with the segments, the expected revenue is convex. As we show in Figure 2 , point (R(η s ), C(η s )) for an optimal advertising rule should lie on the boundary of region Q a . A reasonable conjecture is that η s also lies on the "boundary" of P a . We claim that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each η s lying on the segments between the vertices of P a .
Vertices of C(θ). The cost of uncertainty C(θ) = min a C a (θ) is the minimum of |A| linear functions C a (θ). So we can divide ∆Ω into |A| polytopes,
so that in each polytope P a , action a is always the best action and thus C(θ) = C a (θ) is linear. Let H a be the set of vertices of the polytope P a , H a = vertices of P a .
We prove that there exists an optimal advertising rule with each η s lying on the segments between the vertices in H a for some a.
Lemma 3.4. There exists an optimal advertising rule S, π that has each η s lying on the segments between the vertices in H a for some a, i.e., for all s ∈ S,
and each η s = β · i + (1 − β) · j must have (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0, and for each pair i, j, there is a unique η s that lies on the segment between i, j.
Proof Sketch. Consider an optimal advertising rule S, π and a signal s ∈ S with φ θ (s) > 0. Suppose η s lies in P a , then η s can be represented as a convex combination of the vertices of the polytope,
Let T ⊆ H a be the set of vertices i that has q i > 0. If |T | ≤ 2, then the lemma is proved. Otherwise we claim the follows Claim 3.1. The points {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } in two-dimensional space, which represent the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of i ∈ T , must lie on a line with a nonpositive slope.
If the points {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } does not lie on a line with a nonpositive slope, there are two possibilities, 1. the points lie on a line with a positive slope, 2. the points do not lie on a line.
In both of the cases, we can decompose (R(η s ), C(η s )) along a direction d with positive slope (as shown in Figure 3 ). Therefore according to Lemma 3.2, both of the cases cannot be true for an optimal mechanism. Based on Claim 3.1, we know that {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } must lie on a line with a nonpositive slope. Then we show that if η s does not lie on a segment between two vertices (in other words |T | > 2), we can decompose signal s to a bunch of signals that have η lying on segments between vertices and have the same likelihood ratio and cost of uncertainty. Finally, by Lemma 3.3, we can have a unique η s lying on the segment between i, j for each pair i, j. The full proof is in Appendix A.4.
Then based on Lemma 3.4, we are ready to formulate a convex program to compute the optimal advertising rule. Let G be the set of all possible vertices pairs that can possibly have η s lying between them. G = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ H a for some a, (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0} .
We represent the posterior η s lying on the segment between i, j as φ θ (s)η s = φ θ (s)(βi+(1−β)j) = γ ij ·i+γ ji ·j. Then φ θ (s)R(η s )(η s ) can be represented as
For {i, j} that has (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0, (6) is a concave function of (γ ij , γ ji ), because γij γji γij +γji with negative semidefinite Hessian
ij is a concave function. So we can rewrite the optimization problem (4) as a convex program as follows.
Theorem 3.2. Define G = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ H a for some a, (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0} . The following convex program finds an optimal advertising rule max {i,j}∈G
s.t.
{i,j}∈G
Computation of the Optimal Mechanism
We have known how to find the optimal advertising rule by a convex program given the vertices H a of the polytopes P a . In this section, we show how to compute the vertices H a by finding the basic feasible solutions of the linear equations that defines P a . In addition, When |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, H a will have a polynomial size. So the convex program (7) will have a polynomial size and the optimal advertising rule can be solved in polynomial time.
To find the vertices of the polytope P a , we start with the linear constraints that specify P a . Recall that P a ⊆ ∆Ω is the set of posterior beliefs based on which action a is the best action. P a can be defined by linear equations with non-negative variables as
Variables s a ′ are the slack variables that are added to convert inequality constraints C a (η) − C a ′ (η) ≤ 0 into equality constraints. Then the vertices of P a can be found by solving the basic feasible solutions of (8). We can find all the basic feasible solutions of P = {x : Ax = b, x ≥ 0} as follows. Let B ⊆ [n] be a set of indices that correspond to m linearly independent columns of the matrix A. We can then represent matrix A as the concatenation of two matrices A = [A B | A N ] where A B is the m × m matrix whose columns are indexed by the indices in B, and A N is the m × (n − m) matrix whose columns are indexed by the indices in [n] \ B. Then we have the following lemma. Therefore we can find all the basic feasible solutions by enumerating B ⊆ [n] and computing x B = A −1 B b and checking whether x B ≥ 0. In general, there are exponentially many possible B ⊆ [n] and thus finding all the vertices would take exponential time. However when |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, the number of possible B would not be very large.
Lemma 3.7. When |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, |H a | = poly(|Ω|, |A|) for all a.
Proof. H a , the set of extreme points of the polytope P a , is the set of the basic feasible solutions of (8), which contains |A| constraints and |Ω| + |A| − 1 variables. So there are at most C(|Ω| + |A| − 1, |A|) basic feasible solutions (which is the number of possible choices of basic variables B). When |Ω| or |A| is a constant, C(|Ω| + |A| − 1, |A|) = poly(|Ω|, |A|).
Therefore the problem can be solved efficiently in these two cases. In addition, by Lemma 3.1, there exists an optimal mechanism with size ≤ n.
Theorem 3.3. When the number of actions |A| is a constant or |Ω| is a constant, we can find an optimal advertising rule S, π with |S| ≤ n within polynomial time.
Proof. We can first find an optimal advertising rule using the convex program in Theorem 3.2, which has a polynomial size according to Lemma 3.7. Then we can reduce the size of S to at most n by the method in Lemma 3.1.
Characterization for Small Action Set
Now we consider the case when the buyer has a small number of action |A|. According to Theorem 3.3, the optimal advertising rule can be found in polynomial time when |A| is a constant. We further show that, when |A| is small, there exists an optimal advertising rule that reveals a lot of information to advertise the (remaining) information.
Theorem 3.4. There exists an optimal advertising rule S, π with |S| ≤ n, in which the seller reveals ≤ 2|A| possibilities of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the (remaining) information. Formally, for all s ∈ S, the buyer's posterior η s has no more than 2|A| non-zero entries,
Proof. Recall that the set of vertices H a is a subset of the basic feasible solutions of (8). And each basic feasible solution has |A| non-zero variables, which means that the points in H a have no more than |A| nonzero entries. According to Lemma 3.4, there exists an optimal advertising rule with η s = β · i + (1 − β)j for i, j ∈ H a , a ∈ A, which means that η s will not have more than 2|A| non-zero entries.
When the seller and the buyer have a common prior, the number of possibilities can be further reduced to |A|.
Proposition 3.2. When θ = µ, there exists an optimal advertising rule S, π with |S| ≤ n, that reveals ≤ |A| possibilities of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the (remaining) information, i.e., for all s ∈ S, η s 0 ≤ |A|. Recall that in this case, it is optimal to not give any advertising information and directly charge the buyer his expected gain. The proposition shows that the seller can instead give away a lot of information without hurting the expected revenue. This is because θ can be decomposed into points in H a for some a ∈ A without changing the expected revenue. Details can be found in Appendix A.5.
Characterization for Binary State
In this section, we use the results in the previous sections to give some characterizations of the optimal advertising rule for the case when the state of the world is binary, i.e. |Ω| = 2. First, according to Lemma 3.1, there exists an optimal mechanism that only sends two possible signals to the buyer. In addition, the cost of uncertainty C(η) = C((η 1 , η 2 )) = C((η 1 , 1 − η 1 )) can be represented as a function of η 1 , C(η 1 ) = min a C a (η) = min a η 1 · ∆u(1, a) + (1 − η 1 )∆u(2, a) = min a ∆u(2, a) + η 1 (∆u(1, a) − ∆u(2, a)) where ∆u(ω, a) = max a ′ u(ω, a ′ )− u(ω, a). So C(η 1 ) is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η 1 , as shown in Figure 4 . We define vertices of C(η 1 ) to be the turning points of function C(η 1 ), and let η * 1 = arg max η1 C(η 1 ) be the maximum point of C(η 1 ). Then we claim the follows.
Theorem 3.5. When |Ω| = 2, there exists an optimal advertising rule S, π with S = {s, t}. The optimal advertising rule has η s 1 being a vertex of C(η 1 ) on one side of η * 1 , and η t 1 lying on the other side of η * 1 , as illustrated in Figure 4 . The optimal advertising rule can be solved in O(|A| 2 ) time.
Proof sketch. First by Lemma 3.1, there exists an optimal advertising rule that has |S| = 2. Let S = {s, t}. Without loss of generality assume R((1, 0) > R((0, 1)). Then R(η 1 ) is an increasing function of η 1 . By Lemma 3.2, the optimal advertising rule should not have η s 1 or η t 1 lying on the left of η * 1 and not being a vertex. By Lemma 3.3, the optimal advertising rule should not have both η s 1 and η t 1 on the right of η * 1 . Therefore we must have one of η s 1 and η t 1 being a vertex on the left of η * 1 , and the other one on the right of η * 1 .
The optimal advertising rule can be solved in O(|A| 2 ) time by enumerating all possibilities of η s 1 and η t 1 , and then compute a tangent line of R(η 1 )C(η 1 ). Details can be found in Appendix A.6. Figure 4 : Characterization of the optimal advertising rule when the state of the world is binary. We plot the function C(η 1 ), which is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η 1 . The optimal advertising rule must have η s 1 being one of the vertices on one side of η * 1 , plotted as black dots in the pictures. And η t 1 must lie on the other side of η * 1 , plotted as black segments in the pictures.
Corollary 3.1. When |Ω| = 2 and |A| = 2, there exists an optimal advertising rule S, π that sends two possible signals S = {s, t}. When the buyer receives signal s, he knows the value of ω exactly, π(1, s) = 0, π(2, s) ∈ [0, 1] or π(2, s) = 0, π(1, s) ∈ [0, 1], and the seller charges nothing, p s = 0.
General Problem
We then move to the general problem when the buyer has more than one possible types (i.e. |Θ| > 1) and buyer type is drawn according to distribution µ(ω, θ). It turns out that the general problem is not only NP-hard to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate within a constant factor. We thus turn to some special cases of the problem and give a linear program approximation algorithm for some special cases of the problem.
Hardness of the General Problem
In the general problem of optimal advertising, the seller first advertises the information by sending a signal. Then for each possible realization of the signal, the buyer's valuation of the remaining information will follow a distribution that can be inferred by the seller. Based on this distribution, the seller chooses a best price that will maximize her expected revenue, that is, the price times the probability that the buyer will make the purchase. The problem is hard in general.
Theorem 4.1. Given the support of the state of the world Ω = {1, . . . , n}, the support of the buyer's prior belief of the state of the world Θ ⊆ ∆Ω and a joint distribution over the two µ(ω, θ), as well as the buyer's utility function u(ω, a) for ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A, it is NP-hard to find a constant factor approximation of the optimal advertising rule that maximizes the seller's revenue in expectation.
Note that this hardness result is for the general case when we do not assume the existence of common priors. It thus remains open whether the problem is still NP-hard (to approximate) when there exists a common prior, which is a special case of our general problem.
Approximation for Special Cases
Due to the hardness of the general problem, we investigate some special cases. We show that, for some special cases when it is not too hard to predict the possible type of buyer who will make the purchase, it is possible to find an advertising rule with revenue arbitrarily close to the optimal mechanism within poly(1/ε, |A|, |Ω|, |Θ|) running time, where ε is the upper bound of the difference between our mechanism and the optimal mechanism. Suppose now the seller sends a signal s and charges a price p s . Let Λ(s, p s ) ⊆ Θ be the set of buyer types that would pay for the full revelation of ω, i.e., Λ(s, p s ) ={θ : C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s } (9)
Let Λ be the set of all possible Λ(s, p s ), Λ = {Λ(s, p s ) : s is a signal sent by a signaling scheme π, p s ∈ R} For some special cases, the number of possible Λ(s, p s ), i.e. |Λ| will not be too large.
• When the type space is relatively small, |Θ| = O(log N ) where N = max{|A|, |Ω|}. Then the number of all possible subsets of Θ is O(N ).
• When there is a binary state of the world, i.e. |Ω| = 2. In this case, |Λ| is no more than |Θ| 2 . This is because Λ(s, p s ) must be a convex set, due to its definition (23) and the concavity of the cost of uncertainty function C(·). Therefore, denoting θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ), the types θ in Λ(s, p s ) must have θ 1 lying in an interval [L, R] . Since the type space is discrete, we only need to consider the intervals with endpoints {θ 1 : θ ∈ Θ} to include all Λ(s, p s ). The number of such intervals is no more than |Θ| 2 . We give the full proof in Appendix B.2.
We show that if there are only polynomially many possible Λ(s, p s ), i.e., |Λ| = poly(|A|, |Ω|, |Θ|), there exists an approximation algorithm that can approximate the optimal revenue arbitrarily close.
Theorem 4.2.
Given Ω = {1, . . . , n}, Θ ⊆ ∆Ω and a joint distribution over the two µ(ω, θ), as well as the buyer's utility function u(ω, a) for ω ∈ Ω, a ∈ A. If there are only polynomially many possible Λ(s, p s ), i.e., |Λ| = poly(|A|, |Ω|, |Θ|), then there exists an algorithm that for any ε ∈ (0, 1), finds an advertising rule that achieves expected revenue at least OP T − ε within poly(1/ε, |A|, |Ω|, |Θ|) running time, where OP T is the expected revenue of the optimal advertising rule.
To prove the theorem, we first show that there exists an optimal advertising rule that has each signal s mapping to a unique (p s , Λ(s, p s )).
Lemma 4.1. There exists an optimal advertising rule S, π, {p s : s ∈ S} that satisfy the follows: for any two different signals s, t ∈ S, either p s = p t or Λ(s, p s )) = Λ(t, p t )). In other words, each s ∈ S has a unique (p s , Λ(s, p s )).
We give the proof of the lemma in Appendix B.3. The idea is that if there are two signals with the same (p s , Λ(s, p s )), we can merge them into one. Now we formulate an LP to compute an approximately optimal advertising rule. Since we assume u(ω, a) ∈ [0, 1], the prices charged by the optimal mechanism must lie in [0, 1]. Then we can approximate the prices by choosing p s from a finite set P = {0, ε, 2ε, . . . , 1} with size ≤ ⌊1/ε⌋ + 1. Since the optimal mechanism only needs one signal for each price and each possible Λ(s, p s ), we assign one signal s p,Λ for each pair of p ∈ P and Λ ∈ Λ, so that S = {s p,Λ : p ∈ P, Λ ∈ Λ}. Then let the variables of the LP be the probability transition function of the signaling scheme π(ω, s p,Λ ) for all ω ∈ Ω and s p,Λ ∈ S. We add the constraints so that when s p,Λ is sent and the price is set to p, all the types in Λ will be willing to make the purchase,
By the definition of the cost of uncertainty function 2.2 and the posterior (1), this can be equivalently represented by linear constraints
Then the expected revenue is a linear function of the variables p∈P,Λ∈Λ p ω,θ∈Λ µ(ω, θ)π(ω, s p,Λ ).
Finally we add constraints so that π(·) is a valid signaling scheme s∈S π(ω, s) = 1, ∀ω. π(ω, s) ≥ 0, ∀ω, s.
The LP with objective (11) and constraints (10) and (12) computes an advertising rule with expected revenue at least OP T − ε because by rounding the prices of an optimal advertising rule down to its closest price in P , we get a feasible solution of the LP, and this will not decrease the expected revenue by more than ε.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we have initiated the problem of optimal advertising for information products. We prove the hardness of the problem and present positive results in both the simple setting and the general setting. There are many intriguing directions left open for future work.
• The most appealing open problem would probably be how to get around the strong impossibility results. In this work, we have considered general decision problems and arbitrary distributions. Can one come up with some special but non-trivial utility functions or distributions so that the problem will be tractable? What are the necessary assumptions we need to add for the problem to be easy?
• For our model of general decision problems and arbitrary distributions, there are also some interesting open questions. What are the best approximation algorithms we can find for the general problem?
In particular, our hardness result assumes that there is no common prior between the seller and the buyer. Will the problem still be hard when the buyer and the seller share a common prior? Does the common prior assumption matter?
• It would also be interesting to extend our model to other problems. For example, in this work, the seller only cares about the revenue. What if the seller also cares about the buyer's action? We have studied the design of the optimal advertising rule when it is decided by the seller. What if the advertisement is instead provided by a third-party agent? What would be the best advertising strategy of this thirdparty advertisement provider, and how would it affect the social welfare? We're also not considering the advertising cost. A natural extension is to incorporate the cost into the model.
A Omitted Proofs for Known Buyer Type
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
As shown in Section 3.1, the seller's problem
is equivalent to find the concave closure of f (x) = R(x) · C(x) at a point θ, where R(x) is the likelihood ratio, and C(x) = min a C a (y) is the cost of uncertainty. The concave closure of f (x), denoted by f (x), is equal to
For simplicity, in this section we allow C a (y) = c T a y to have negative coefficients (by definition, C a (y) should always has non-negative coefficients). This is without loss of generality because we can always equivalently consider C a (y) = n i=1 y i max a ′ C a ′ (e i ) − C a (e i ) , which is a valid cost of uncertainty function with nonnegative coefficients.
We will introduce a new problem that is closely related to (13). We will prove the hardness of this new problem and then use it to prove the hardness of (13).
Since the feasible solution (α, β) of (13) forms a convex set, the ellipsoid method can be applied to solve (13) if there is a cutting-plane oracle that, for any point (α, β), returns a y such that α T y + β < f (y) if there exists one and returns "feasible" if α T y + β ≥ f (y), ∀y. To have such a cutting-plane oracle, it suffices to solve
where R(x) = n i=1 x i · µi θi is a linear function and C(x) = min a C a (x) in which C a (x) is a linear function of x. This can be solved by solving
We first show that (14) is hard to solve for specific R(y), C a (y), α.
Lemma A.1. There exist fixed R(y) = r T y, C a (y) = c T a y, fixed α, and partially fixed C(y), such that deciding whether the solution of (14) is greater or equal to 0 is NP-complete, and the maximum must be achieved at point y with
Proof. We use reduction from the following problem, which is proved to be NP-complete in [Pardalos and Vavasis, 1991] .
Quadratic programming with one negative eigenvalue [Pardalos and Vavasis, 1991] . There exist fixed non-negative vectors γ, β with length n, and partially fixed A, b, so that it is NP-complete to decide whether
And the maximum of (15) must be achieved at binary y, i.e., y ∈ {0, 1} n .
We construct an instance of (14) that is equivalent to an instance of (15). We first scale the variables so that the feasible region is a subset of ∆ n . Define x = 1 n y, we have the following NP-hard problem,
where γ, β are non-negative vectors with length n. We add a variable z = 1 − i x i , so that (16) is equivalent to
Then we replace all the constants by their products with 1 T x + z, which is equal to 1,
(17) is an instance of (14) by letting y = (x, z), R(y) = C a (y) = β T x + 0 · z, α = (γ, 0), and defining a bunch of C a ′ (y) so that linear constraints C a (y) − C a ′ (y) ≤ 0 equal the linear constraints in (17).
We then show that it is hard to solve max y∈∆n {R(y) · C(y) − α T y}.
Lemma A.2. There exist fixed R(y) = r T y, fixed α and partially fixed C(y), such that deciding whether the solution of (18) is greater or equal to 0 is NP-complete, and the maximum must be achieved at point y with y j ∈ {0, 1/n} for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1, y n = 1 − n−1 j=1 y j .
Proof. We construct an instance of (18) that is equivalent to (14). Suppose we have an instance of (14)
We show that we can change C a ′ (y) for a ′ = a so that the maximum of function R(y) · C(y) − α T y cannot lie within region C a ′ (y) < C a (y), i.e., (c a ′ − c a ) T y < 0 for any a ′ . The gradient of R(y) · C(y) − α T y is equal to 
Note that we can increase c a ′ − c a by a factor of k without changing c a and region {y : C a ′ (y) < C a (y)} (or equivalently the direction of c a ′ − c a ) by replacing c a ′ with
Since R(y 0 ) = r T y 0 ≥ min i {r i } is bounded from below by a positive constant, we can choose k that is large enough so that the directional derivative (19) is negative for all the points between y 0 and y * , which means that R(y 0 )C(y 0 ) − α T y 0 < R(y * )C(y * ) − α T y * . So y 0 cannot be the maximum point. So we replace c a ′ with c a ′ for all a ′ = a to get the new cost of uncertainty function C(y) so that the maximum So to solve (18), we only need to find the maximum of concave function f (y)−α T y at points that satisfy (20). If we have an oracle that solves the concave closure f (y) defined in (13), then we can use the ellipsoid method to find the maximum of f (y)−α T y. When we know the maximum point must have (20) and only need to find the maximum at points with (20), the ellipsoid method can terminate within polynomially many iterations, by the same arguments as in [Goemans, 2005] . Therefore the NP-hard problem (18) is polynomial-time reducible to finding the concave closure f . Therefore the seller's optimal information advertising problem is NP-hard.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Let S, π be an optimal advertising rule. Suppose S = {s 1 , . . . , s k } with k > n. For simplicity, we write η (i) = η si as the posterior when s i is received, and φ (i) = φ θ (s i ) as the probability of receiving s based on the buyer's belief θ. WLOG assume φ (i) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Since k > n we must have η (1) , . . . , η (k) linearly dependent. So there exists non-zero vector α with α 1 η (1) + · · · + α k η (k) = 0.
WLOG assume α 1 = 0. Then
We can then try to reduce the size of S by substituting η (1) with − α2 α1 η (2) − · · · − α k α1 η (k) , that is, reducing φ (1) by δ and increasing other φ (i) by − αi α1 δ. This will not violate the constraints of (4). We increase the value of δ until one of φ (i) reaches 0 and that signal can be removed from S. Since we are considering an optimal advertising rule, we must have the value of f (x) = R(x)C(x) satisfying
otherwise we can substitute one of η (1) and − α2 α1 η (2) − · · · − α k α1 η (k) with another to strictly increase the objective value without violating the constraints. Therefore as long as k > n, we can reduce the size of S by one without violating the constraints or changing the objective value.
Consider an optimal advertising rule S, π and a signal s ∈ S with φ θ (s) > 0. Suppose η s lies in P a , then η s can be represented as a convex combination of the vertices of the polytope,
Let T ⊆ H a be the set of vertices i that has q i > 0. If |T | ≤ 2, then the lemma is proved. Otherwise we claim the follows Claim A.1. The points {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } in two-dimensional space, which represent the likelihood ratio and the cost of uncertainty of i ∈ T , must lie on a line with a nonpositive slope.
In both of the cases, we can decompose (R(η s ), C(η s )) along a direction d with positive slope (as shown in Figure 5 ).
• In Case (1), when {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } lie on a line with a positive slope, suppose (R(l), C(l)) with l ∈ T is one of the endpoints of segment Q a . Since η s = i∈Ha q i · i and q i ∈ (0, 1) for all i, there exists small enough ε so that
Therefore η s can be decomposed as
• In Case (2), there must exist a convex combination l = i∈T w i ·i so that (R(l)−R(η s ))(C(l)−C(η s )) > 0. Again there must exist small enough ε such that
Then η s can be decomposed as
Therefore according to Lemma 3.2, both of the cases cannot be true for an optimal mechanism. Based on Claim 3.1, we know that {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T } must lie on a line with a nonpositive slope. Then we show that if |T | > 2, we can decompose signal s to a bunch of signals that have η lying on segments between vertices. More specifically, we can decompose η s into a convex combination of some points with the same likelihood ratio and cost of uncertainty,
with each point η (l) = β · i + (1 − β) · j for some i, j ∈ T and (R(η (l) ), C(η (l) )) = (R(η s ), C(η s )), for 1 ≤ l ≤ k. We find η (1) , η (2) , . . . , η (k) by repeating the following process • At step l, let i * , j * ∈ T be the two endpoints on the segment of {(R(i), C(i)) : i ∈ T }. Then there exists β * ∈ (0, 1) such that β * (R(i * ), C(i * )) + (1 − β * )(R(j * ), C(j * )) = (R(η s ), C(η s )).
At each step, we find an η (l) and reduce the size of T at least by one. Repeat this process until |T | ≤ 2, we find an advertising rule that has each posterior lying on the segments between i, j ∈ T ⊆ H a . All the points i ∈ T have (R(i), C(i)) lying on a line with a nonpositive slope, so we have (R(i * )−R(j * ))(C(i * )−C(j * )) ≤ 0 for all i * , j * . It remains to prove that for each pair i, j, there is a unique η s lying on the segment between i, j. Suppose there are two posteriors η s , η t lying on the segment between i, j with (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) ≤ 0. If (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) < 0, then by Lemma 3.3, we must have (R(η s ), C(η s )) = (R(η t ), C(η t )). So we can merge s and t into one signal without changing the objective value. If (R(i) − R(j))(C(i) − C(j)) = 0, then either R(η s ) = R(η t ) or C(η s ) = C(η t ). In both of the cases, merging s and t will not decrease the objective value as R(·) is a linear function and C(·) is a concave function.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
We prove that when θ = µ, there exists an optimal advertising rule that reveals ≤ |A| possibilities of the realized state of the world ω to the buyer before selling the (remaining) information. Recall that in this case, the optimal advertising problem is equivalent to finding the concave closure of f (x) = C(x),
The optimal objective value is C(θ) being achieved at
which means is optimal to not give any advertising information and directly charge the buyer his expected gain. We show that η s = θ can be decomposed into points in H a for some a ∈ A without changing the Figure 6 : Characterization of the optimal advertising rule when the state of the world is binary. We plot the function C(η 1 ), which is the minimum of |A| linear functions of η 1 . The optimal advertising rule must have η s 1 being one of the vertices on one side of η * 1 , plotted as black dots in the pictures. And η t 1 must lie on the other side of η * 1 , plotted as black segments in the pictures.
expected revenue. Assume that θ ∈ P a , then θ can be decomposed into a convex combination of the vertices in H a , θ = i∈Ha q i · i.
Since C(x) is linear within P a , we can decompose θ into i∈Ha as
and the objective function value remains unchanged
The vertices in H a has no more than |A| non-zero entries by Definition 3.1 and Lemma 3.5. Finally we can decrease the number of signals |S| to ≤ n by the same method in the proof of Lemma 3.1.
B Omitted Proofs for the General Problem
B.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We prove Theorem 4.1 by reduction from the AlmostColoring problem from [Khot and Saket, 2012] :
For any constant ε ∈ (0, 1 2 ], and positive integers k and q such that q ≥ 2 k + 1, given a graph G(V, E), it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two cases:
NO Case: There is no independent set in G of size |V | q k+1 . For any instance of AlmostColoring, we construct an optimal information advertising problem whose solution can be used to distinguish the YES Case and the NO Case. Let the state of the world be one of the vertices, i.e., Ω = V and n = |V |. The buyer can possibly have |V | different prior beliefs Θ = {θ (v) : v ∈ V }. The buyer with prior belief θ (v) initially thinks that ω is highly likely to be one of the neighbors of v:
where N (v) is the set of the neighboring vertices of v (not including v). For simplicity, we call a buyer with prior belief θ (v) a type-v buyer. Assume both the state of the world ω and the buyer's prior θ are uniformly distributed, and ω and θ are independent, i.e., µ(ω, θ) = µ(ω)µ(θ) = 1 n · 1 n for ω ∈ Ω = V and When the buyer takes L (v) , he will have zero utility when the state of the world is realized to v and otherwise have utility M , i.e., u(v, L (v) ) = 0, u(j, L (v) ) = M for j = v.
Then we claim the follows.
Claim B.1. In the YES Case, there exists a mechanism that achieves expected revenue ≥ M n . In the NO Case, there exists no mechanism that has expected revenue > 2M qn .
We first show that in the YES Case, there exists a mechanism that has expected revenue M n . Consider the signaling scheme that reveals which independent set ω belongs to, i.e., there are q possible signals S = {s 1 , . . . , s q } and π(ω, s i ) = 1, if ω ∈ V i 0, otherwise Because V i is an independent set, for any vertex v ∈ V i , the posterior of a type-v buyer after receiving s i is the uniform distribution over V i . It is then easy to verify that for any type-v buyer with v ∈ V i , the cost of uncertainty equals M d after receiving s i . So if the seller sets a price M d , at least |Vi| |V | = d n portion of the buyers will pay for the full revelation of ω after receiving s i . This holds for all s i ∈ S. Therefore the seller can have at least M d · d n = M n expected revenue. We then show that in the NO Case, there exists no mechanism that has expected revenue > M qn . Let's consider an arbitrary mechanism that first sends a signal s ∈ S using signaling scheme π : Ω → ∆S, and for the full revelation of ω, which means p s ≤ M qn . Therefore the seller's expected revenue conditioning on sending s is no more than M qn . In both of the cases, the seller's expected revenue conditioning on sending s is no more than 2M qn . This holds for all s. Therefore in the NO Case, the expected revenue of any mechanism ≤ 2M qn . For any constant c, by setting q = 2c 2 , Claim B.1 implies that it is NP-hard to find c-approximation of the optimal mechanism.
B.2 Efficient Approximation for Binary State
Recall that Λ(s, p s ) ⊆ Θ is the set of buyer types that would pay for the full revelation of ω, i.e., Λ(s, p s ) ={θ : C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s }
Let Λ be the set of all possible Λ(s, p s ), Λ = {Λ(s, p s ) : s is a signal sent by a signaling scheme π, p s ∈ R}
We show that when there is a binary state of the world, i.e. |Ω| = 2, |Λ| is no more than |Θ| 2 . This is because Λ(s, p s ) ={θ : C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s } must be a convex set. By definition, the posterior belief of a type-θ buyer after receiving a signal s is equal to η s (θ) = θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s) n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s)
And the cost of uncertainty function is the minimum of |A| linear functions. Although the cost of uncertainty function is defined on ∆Ω, we can naturally extend the domain to [0, 1] n so that C(kη) = kC(η).
Then we have C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s ⇐⇒ C θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s) ≥ p s n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s).
The left hand side C(θ 1 π(1, s), . . . , θ n π(n, s)) is a concave function of θ, and the right hand side p s n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s) is a linear function of θ. Therefore, Λ(s, p s ) = {θ : C(η s (θ)) ≥ p s } must be a convex set. Denote θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ). Since Λ(s, p s ) is a convex set, the types θ in Λ(s, p s ) must have θ 1 lying in an interval [L, R] . Then as the type space is discrete, we only need to consider the intervals with endpoints {θ 1 : θ ∈ Θ} to include all Λ(s, p s ). The number of such intervals is no more than |Θ| 2 .
B.3 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Consider an arbitrary optimal advertising rule S, π, {p s : s ∈ S} . Suppose there exist two signals s, t ∈ S with (p s , Λ(s, p s )) = (p t , Λ(t, p t )). Then we can merge s, t into one signal s ′ as follows π(ω, s ′ ) = π(ω, s) + π(ω, t) for all ω p s ′ = p s = p t .
Then according to (1), for any buyer with type θ ∈ Λ(s, p s ) = Λ(t, p t ), his posterior after seeing s ′ is η s ′ (θ) = 1 n ω=1 θ ω (π(ω, s) + π(ω, t)) η s (θ) n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, s) + η t (θ) n ω=1 θ ω π(ω, t)
= kη s (θ) + (1 − k)η t (θ).
Since the cost of uncertainty function is concave,
So the buyer will still be willing to pay p s ′ . The expected revenue will not decrease.
C Optimal Information Disclosure Rayo and Segal [2010] studies the following problem. There is a sender endowed with a prospect, which is randomly drawn from a finite set P = {1, . . . , N }. The probability of i being realized is p i > 0 and n i=1 p i = 1. Each i ∈ P is characterized by its payoffs (π i , v i ) ∈ R 2 , where π i is the prospect's profitability for the sender, and v i is its value to the receiver.
The sender chooses a disclosure rule σ, S to send a signal s ∈ S drawn from σ(i) to the receiver. The receiver observes the signal s, and decides whether to "accept" (a = 1) or " not accept" (a = 0). The receiver forgoes an outside option worth r ∈ R, which is a random variable independent of i. So the sender's payoff is a · π and the receiver's payoff is a(v − r).
Assume v ∈ [0, 1] and r ∼ U[0, 1]. Then the sender's expected payoff is
Optimal Information Disclosure as Optimal Advertising. Consider a Optimal Advertising problem with common buyer prior. Let the state of the world be the realization of the prospect, Ω = P . Let the buyer's common prior equal to the probability distribution of the prospect, i.e., θ i = p i . And let the true underlying distribution µ satisfy µi θi ∝ π i , i.e., µi θi = π i · M where M is a constant so that i θ i π i · M = 1. Finally let the cost of uncertainty be the expected value of the prospect, i.e., C(θ) = E θ [v] = n i=1 θ i v i . 3 Then it is easy to verify that (24) is equivalent to the optimal advertising problem (3) with a constant factor difference in the objective function,
